







UNLIKELY FISSURES AND UNEASY RESONANCES: LESBIAN 




ABSTRACT. This article explores commonalities between parental claims for lesbian co-mothers and 
other contexts in which intention is a key aspect to family formation for (mostly) heterosexual families: 
in particular, surrogacy and pre-birth disputes over embryos. Through a series of case studies drawn 
from recent reproductive controversies, the paper uses the lens of empathy to argue for social or non- 
genetic modes of parenthood connecting lesbian mothers and other ‘reproductive outsiders’. 
 









While many scholars have analysed the legal status of heterosexual families formed 
through assisted reproduction, and others have argued for reforms to specifically 
recognise lesbian-led families, there is relatively little engagement across and between 
these areas of research (see Bender 2006; Storrow 2002 for exceptions). This article 
explores commonalities between claims to parenthood that are not based on genetic 
connection, examining resonances between the position of lesbian mothers and other 
contexts  in  which  intention  is  key  to  family  formation  for  (mostly)  heterosexual 
families; in particular surrogacy and pre-birth disputes over embryos. 
 
Lesbian co-mothers are in a situation which parallels that of infertile men who 
have children through assisted reproductive  technology (ART) in the sense that both 
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unrelated.2 Previously I have argued that lesbian co-mothers should be accorded full 
parental   status   in   law   (Millbank   2008b;   Millbank   2003)   using   a   model   that 
approximately reflects laws in many jurisdictions granting parental status to non- 
biological parents in heterosexual families formed through the use of donor gametes 
(based on consent to the use of an assisted conception process).3  Also common to both 
lesbian and heterosexual parents, if using in vitro fertilisation processes (IVF), is an 
experience of conception that is prolonged over months or even years – and thus 
increases  opportunities  for changes  of mind and misunderstandings.  There are also 
less tangible parallels between lesbian co-parents and fathers in their emotionally 
involved but physically distant relation to the gestation and birth process. 
 
 
The commonalities between heterosexual families formed through surrogacy 
arrangements  and  lesbian-led  families  are  not  initially  obvious.  Surrogate  families 
involve commissioning parents and a gestational mother; usually the commissioning 
father is also a genetic parent, less commonly the commissioning mother is also (if, for 
example, she has viable eggs but cannot sustain a pregnancy). While in some 
arrangements  the gestational  mother is also the genetic mother, donor eggs may be 
used if the commissioning mother is unable to contribute her own eggs, in which case 
four adults share the roles of genetic, gestational and social parents in a conception 
process  that necessitates  the use of IVF.   Lesbian-led  families  are generally  formed 
with the use of donor sperm. While the choice of anonymous donor or known donor 








Other jurisdictions extend such status only to some heterosexual couples, such as married couples, or couples 
conceiving through the use of state sanctioned health services or with the use of anonymous donated gametes: I do 






lesbians prefer to conceive in informal circumstances with an identifiable donor (who 
is not generally seen as a parent but will often have a family-friend or avuncular 
relationship,  see eg. Donovan  2000; Almack 2006). Thus they, too, involve another 




Progressive  and critical  scholars  who support  recognition  of lesbian  and gay 
family forms may baulk at comparisons with surrogacy. The practice of surrogacy has 
been subject to acerbic feminist criticism, particularly in the United States (US), for 
commodifying women’s reproductive labour and reinforcing a multitude of structural 
power imbalances (see eg. Rothman 1992). Yet there are strong thematic and legal 
resonances across lesbian parenting and surrogacy that deserve serious consideration. 
Surrogacy represents the outer edge of non-nuclear or non-autonomous reproduction 
for  heterosexual   families.   Regardless   of  the   economic   power   of  commissioning 
parents, they are disempowered in the sense that they have struggled to form a family 
and have had to resort to (some would say, extremely) non-normative means to do so. 
Surrogate parents are placed in the position of lesbian families in that they need the 
involvement of another adult in order to conceive, they may face legal sanctions or 
disincentives in this process, they will often have one member of the couple who is not 
genetically related to their child and they are at the mercy of fertility services which 
may refuse to treat them. Moreover, if successful, the intended family form (and actual 
family   function)   achieved   through   surrogacy   is   generally   unrecognised   by   law 
(Stuhmcke  2004;  Seymour  &  Magri  2004).  In  short,  heterosexual  commissioning 
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Part I of the article sets out the context in which these issues are being raised, 
noting the rise of three distinct socio-legal trends: the creation of legal rights for same- 
sex  couples  and  parents;  the  increasing  influence  of ‘fathers’  rights’  movements  in 
family law; and the rise of genetic essentialism. The complex and contradictory inter- 
relation of these trends is explored through an initial case study of two Canadian cases 
concerning the naming of parents on children’s birth certificates.  In Parts II and III of 
the  article,  resonances  between  the  positions  of  non-genetic  families  are  explored 
through   a   series   of   case   studies   drawn   from   recent   controversies   in   assisted 
reproduction  involving heterosexual  couples concerning disputes over embryo use in 
the  UK  and  a  surrogacy  arrangement  in  Australia.  These  cases  raise  the  central 
difficulty of deciding who parents are when genetics are de-centred but intention is 
confounded by deceit or a change of mind. 
 
 
In analysing these cases in Parts II and III, I engage openly with feelings of 
empathy and with the idea of empathy. Empathy is “a form of understanding” 
(Henderson 1987, 1576)  which illuminates the situation of another and makes it 
intelligible; as such it is also a means of acquiring knowledge (D’Arms 2000, 1469). 
Recognising what you feel, and for whom you feel, in any given controversy is an 
important moment in the creation or interpretation of legal rules. Empathy, like legal 





It also appears increasingly likely that gay men may utilise surrogacy to form their own families (as opposed to 
jointly parenting with lesbian mothers) particularly if other avenues such as adoption remain inaccessible either 
through formal exclusion or practical barriers. 
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respectful of diversity and able to recognise a broad range of family forms. I argue that 
empathy is a way of taking into account different experiences, perspectives and subject 
positions in the face of often highly abstracted legal argument, and of exploring and 
understanding      important      commonalities      among      otherwise      heterogeneous 
‘reproductive outsiders’. Ultimately, I conclude that empathy is an interpretative  tool 
 
that helps us to look behind singular moments of ‘consent’ in disputes to examine 




This  does  not  mean  that  every  —  or  any  —  feeling  of  empathy  necessarily 
provides the ‘right’ answer in any of the cases discussed below. Rather, acknowledging 
and  exploring  feelings  of  empathy  are  an  important  part  of  interpretative  inquiry 
because  they draw attention  to what we value, and hopefully  help us to understand 
why this is so (see in particular Nussbaum 2001, although she prefers “compassion” to 
“empathy”). At the outset I acknowledge two quintessential ‘values’ informing my 
approach: first, a refusal to prioritise genetic relationships and, second, the validation 
of non-biological  parenting relationships  as an important and ‘natural’ part of many 
non-traditional family forms.5 
 
Fathers’ Rights and the  Rise of  the  Genetic Family: Who’s your Bedfellow 
Now? 
 
The growth  in families  formed  through  ART has taken  place against  a backdrop  of 
other social developments,  including increasing diversity in family forms through the 
growth of single-parent  households and fragmentation  of biological families through 
 
5   
Julie  Shapiro  has  written  that,  “Challenging  the  primacy  of  the  biological  link  as  the  defining  factor  in 
parenthood was a necessary step in order for lesbians to raise children within their own families”.  Both co-mother 
recognition and the non-inclusion of sperm donors as fathers in lesbian-led families “required, and continues to 
require the denial of parental rights based purely on genetics” (Shapiro 2006, 598-599). 
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divorce and separation. A significant shift away from ‘traditional’ family is indicated by 
extensive reforms in many Western countries in recent decades recognising same-sex 
partnerships and, more recently, granting parenting rights such as second-parent 
adoption to same-sex couples. This trend is dramatically at odds with a second notable 
movement in family law and policy through the past decade: the rise of reforms 
enhancing,  to  varying  degrees,  ‘fathers’  rights’  (Graycar  2000;  on  trans-national 
trends in fathers’ rights, see Collier & Sheldon 2006). In socio-political terms these 
movements are plainly pulling in opposite directions. Same-sex reforms generally 
promote a ‘reflective’ or adaptive role for family law and de-centre the hetero-nuclear 
family  as the only, or favoured,  object  of social  policy  (see  Millbank  2008a),  while 
fathers’ rights claims vigorously promote the disciplining or normative role of law to 
keep families together, and argue for traditional gender roles as a key aspect to 
maintenance  of the hetero-nuclear  family as the foundational  social institution  (see 
Boyd 2006). In the bluntest possible contrast, lesbian mothers seek the creation and 
legal recognition of fatherless families, while fathers’ rights advocates valorise fathers’ 
roles   as   eternal   and   irreplaceable.   Yet   in   legal   terms,   these   otherwise   starkly 
oppositional   trends  of  same-sex   recognition   and  fathers’  rights  are  not  entirely 
dissimilar.  To borrow  Helen  Rhoades’  term,  both  groups  “yearn”  for law (Rhoades 
2006), focussing enormous efforts on legislative change as a path to social reform and 
adhering closely, even devotedly, to formal equality jurisprudence and discourse to 
ground their claims to “equal” treatment (Young & Boyd 2006). 
 
 
An example of the unlikely convergence of same-sex and fathers’ rights equality 
claims is the 2006 Ontario case of Rutherford  v Ontario  (released as MDR v Ontario 
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in  the  unreported  version).6   In  that  case,  four  sets  of  lesbian  parents  successfully 
claimed  that  birth  registry  provisions  excluding  the  co-mother  were  in  breach  of 
equality  guarantees  in  the  Canadian  Charter  of  Rights  and  Freedoms.  While  the 
judgment is a nuanced and contextual analysis of social parenting that goes to some 
lengths to validate the lived experience of lesbian families, it is remarkable that it drew 
upon the reasoning in the Supreme Court of Canada decision of Trociuk v British 
Columbia.7   Trociuk concerned a father’s equality claim when the mother had chosen 
not  to ‘acknowledge’  him  on the  birth  certificate;  a right  granted  to her  under  the 
relevant birth registration scheme. Trociuk is a classic fathers’ rights claim, concerning 
a   relatively   uninvolved   biological   father,   who   was   not   living   with   (and   only 
occasionally seeing) the sons whom he wished to bear his surname. The mother, Reni 
Ernst, gave the children her own surname as she, 
felt there was no reason why the children should bear the last name of somebody that I was not 
married to and had no plans to set up a life with. I saw no important connection between [his] 
ability to be a good father, if that is what he wanted, and the children bearing his last name 
(quoted in Gavigan 2006, 322). 
 
 
In a brief judgment, lacking any contextual or substantive analysis of inequality,8  the 
Supreme  Court  of  Canada  held  that  the  “arbitrary”  exclusion  of  Trociuk’s 
“participation”  in the register and naming of the children was unlawful  sex 
discrimination   (Lessard   2004).  Control   over  children’s   registration   and  naming 






Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General) (2006) 270 DLR (4
th
) 90; MDR v Ontario (Deputy Registrar 
General) [2006] OJ No 2268. 
 
7  
Trociuk v British Columbia (Attorney-General) [2003] 1 SCR 835. In particular, see Rutherford  v Ontario 
(Deputy Registrar General) (2006) 270 DLR (4
th
) 90, para 232. 
 
8  
For example, the patriarchal custom of children bearing men’s names is unexamined. Moreover, the historical 
disadvantage faced by women in relation to their children’s names is entirely reversed in the judgment which 
refers to this simply as gender-neutral evidence of the “significance of choosing a surname”: Trociuk v British 
Columbia [2003] 1 SCR 835, para 18. 
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significant mode of participation in the life of a child”.9 As Shelley Gavigan argues, “It 
is   almost   impossible   to   imagine   a   more   formal,   less   substantive,   notion   of 





Both Gavigan and Hester Lessard have argued that Trociuk privileges biological 
parenthood over social parenting and reinscribes patriarchal power relations (Gavigan 
2006, 321-325; Lessard 2004). It is likely that Trociuk would prevent lesbian families 
in many  Canadian  provinces  from  excluding  a known  sperm  donor  from  the  birth 
registry   if  he  wanted   to  be   named   on  it,  potentially   both   denying   co-mother 
recognition and imposing a legal father onto a lesbian-led family.10 It is therefore 
somewhat unnerving to see the lesbian social parents in Rutherford  frame their claim 
using  the  language  of  Trociuk.11   The  abstract  nature  of  precedent  and  language  of 
formal equality make Trociuk and Rutherford look ‘alike’. Vital differences in the 
respective  social  and legal  power  positions  of ‘parents’  are elided in the judgments 
such that they appear as if natural progressions in a series of cases regarding children’s 
birth certificates. While Darell Trociuk argued for the equal treatment of biological 
mothers  and  fathers  regardless  of  any  shared  intention  or  care  of  children,  the 
mothers in Rutherford  argued for the equal treatment of non-biological mothers with 










Ibid para 17 (emphasis added); see also para 16 on birth registration as “an important means of participating in 
the life of a child”, and para 19 characterising both as “meaningful participation in a child’s life”. 
 
10 
A donor named on the birth registry would not only take the place of a co-mother being named but could also 
then oppose second-parent adoption by her. 
 
11  “Birth registration provides an important means for parents to participate in their child’s life”: Applicants’ 
Factum quoted in Rutherford v Ontario (Deputy Registrar General) (2006) 270 DLR (4
th
) 90, para 38. 
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lesbian mothers can more genuinely be characterised as seeking to ‘participate’ rather 
than ‘control’ the child’s name.12 
 
 
It  is  worth  belabouring  the  point  that  the  pre-existing  power  positions  of 
biological fathers and lesbian co-mothers could not be more different. As Jocelyn Elise 
Crowley points out, similarities in the use of equality discourse may be extremely 
deceptive as, while marginalised groups (such as lesbians and gay men) are “fighting 
for power that they never held”, fathers’ rights advocates are “demanding change from 
a  position  of  already  deeply-held  power  across  multiple  social  domains”  (Crowley 
2006,  99, emphasis  in original).  Like  Reni  Ernst,  the  mothers  in Rutherford  were 
raising children in ‘fatherless’ or female-headed households in which actual caregiving 
replaced genetics as the most important basis of connection.   While genetics and not 
caregiving is the core of fathers’ rights’ claims, for lesbian co-mothers it is the reverse, 
begging the question of how they came to be bedfellows here. 
 
 
This contrast highlights a third cultural trend, which undergirds fathers’ rights 
movements while undermining those of same-sex families: the rising notion of ‘genetic 
truth’ and its relationship to familial ideology (see eg. Dolgin 2000). Fathers’ rights 
movements   have   been  very  successful   in  the  past  decade   in  drawing   on  both 
discourses of ‘involved’ or ‘new’ fatherhood and of genetic truth to implement fathers’ 
rights claims into mainstream family law (see eg. Rhoades 2006; Smart 2006; Diduck 
2007). A cultural preoccupation  with genetic information  has been translated  into a 
child’s right to know the ‘truth’ of their genetic origins (Donovan 2006). This has in 




One study suggests that, like Reni Ernst, many lesbian mothers see naming as primarily the responsibility of the 
birth mother (even if the name given is that of the co-mother or a hyphenated name) (Almack 2005). 
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unquestioned assumption in the family law context of benefit to children from an on- 
going  relationship  with (even previously unknown) genetic relatives. In this context 
‘genetic  truth’  may  well  be  a  stick  that  is  increasingly  used  to  ‘beat’  both  lesbian 
mothers and heterosexual families formed with the use of donor gametes. 
 
 




One case that provokes consideration  of the connection  between lesbian co-mothers 
and heterosexual  fathers  most  keenly  is Re R in the  United  Kingdom  (UK).13  That 
dispute   concerned   an   unmarried   heterosexual   couple   who   had   sought   fertility 
treatment initially because the man, Mr B, was infertile due to earlier treatment for 
testicular cancer. It became clear at some time that there was also ‘a further organic 
reason’ that the woman, Ms D, had difficulty in conceiving. Ms D underwent IVF with 
Mr B’s support and embryos were created with the use of anonymous  donor sperm. 
The first cycle was unsuccessful. When Ms D undertook a second transfer cycle using a 
stored embryo the following year, the couple had broken up, but she did not alert the 
hospital to this fact nor did she tell Mr B that she was continuing with treatment. This 
cycle was successful and after the child’s birth, Mr B sought a declaration of parental 
responsibility and contact with the child, both of which were opposed by the mother. 
Although both the mother and the separate representative for the child initially agreed 
that Mr B was a legal father,14  this was subsequently doubted by the Court of Appeal 





Re R [2001] 1 FLR 247; B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843; Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA); Re R (a child) [2005] 
2 AC 621 (HL). 
 
14 
Re R [2001] 1 FLR 247. 
 
15 
See B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 2. 
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parent  was initially  decided  in his favour,  but subsequently  denied  by the Court  of 
 




In the second reported judgment in the string of cases, Hedley J stated: 
Formatted: Indent: First line: 
1.27 cm 
 
Of course in this case one must have considerable sympathy with B. He wishes to be R’s father 
and has responsibly fulfilled his obligations under my original order… Sympathy  is, however, 
an unreliable aid to statutory  construction. On exactly the same facts one could have a woman 
seeking money from a man, despite her deception, and asking for an order [declaring parental 
status] for that purpose. In those circumstances the sympathy would be all the other way.18 
 
 
Hedley  J,  like  many  of  the  other  judges  in  the  cases  under  discussion,  distrusts 
 
‘sympathy’ as an emotion that merely confuses the reasoned process of statutory 
construction.  Empathy  and  sympathy  are  related  but  distinct  emotions,  which  are 
often referred to as though they are inter-changeable.  While empathy is more akin to 
identification or fellow-feeling, sympathy is more closely connected to feelings of pity 
and as such can be a distancing or ‘third-personal’ feeling in a way that empathy is not 
(see D’Arms 2000, 1477-1479; Henderson 1987, 1579-1581). In this instance I would 
argue  that,  despite  the  use  of  the  word  ‘sympathy’,  Hedley’s  judgment  is  more 
suggestive of an empathic response to Mr B’s position. 
 
 
On first reading the Re R cases, I empathised with Mr B, but for rather different 
reasons than those apparent in the judgment. Unlike Hedley J, my concern was not 
that  the  child  R  would  be  ‘deprived’   of  a  father,  or  that  ART  could  promote 





Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA). 
 
17 
Re R [2005] 2 AC 621 (HL). 
 
18 
B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 8 (emphasis added). 
 
19 
B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 9. Indeed, the potential of ART to produce ‘fatherless’ children for lesbian 
families is regarded as a benefit in my analysis. 
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resembling that of a lesbian co-mother; his case rested on an intention to parent and 
participation in a joint enterprise to conceive a child rather than any genetic link. Sally 
Sheldon has expressed Mr B’s claim as one of “emotional investment” in R (Sheldon 
2005a,  356).  Carol  Smart  has  classically  noted  the  difference  between  men  caring 
“about” children while women care “for” them (Smart 1991; Smart 1995), and here Mr 
B’s claim appears to fall squarely in the “about” camp - as he has not at any stage lived 
with or looked after the child (indeed through the years of litigation he had not yet met 
her).  In this sense  Smart  characterises  Mr B’s position  as akin to many traditional 
‘fathers’  rights’  claims,  in  which  men  assert  the  (equal)  right  to  begin  caring  for 
children  upon  separation  regardless  of  whether  they  provided  any  care  prior  to  it 
(Smart  2006,  135).  Yet,  unlike  a  traditional  fathers’  rights  claim,  Mr  B  was  not 
demanding “equality” with the mother, or a relationship with the child based on the 
perceived importance of an enduring genetic tie. In an interview quoted by Sheldon, 
Mr B claimed that he did not think of himself as “a champion of fathers’ rights” nor 
had he ever been “part of a legal crusade” (Chrisafis 2001; Sheldon 2005a, 356). 
Eschewing “rights talk” for “care talk” (Smart 2006), Mr B added, “I have simply loved 
[R] from the moment I heard she was born” (quoted in Sheldon 2005a, 356). 
 
 
In the same interview, Mr B referred at length to the fact that the sperm donor 
was  selected  based  on  similarity  to  his  own  physical  characteristics,20   a point  also 
briefly  touched  on  in  Hedley  J’s  judgment.21   Smart  wonders  at  how  this  potential 
physical resemblance strengthens the man’s claim to fatherhood (2006, 129), and it is 
possible  to  read  his  claim  as  simply  reinscribing  a  simulacrum  of  the  genetic  tie. 
 
20  
In addition, the press article commences with a description of Mr B showing a photo of the child to the 
journalist and stating, “Look at the likeness. She’s got my eyes and colouring, my smile, my face shape. Everyone 
says it. She looks just like me” (Chrisafis 2001). 
 
21 
B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 5. 
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However, I recall that in numerous cases involving lesbian co-mothers they too assert 
their involvement in the process of selecting the sperm donor for their children, and 
frequently  note  that  donors  are  chosen  for  characteristics  similar  to  themselves, 
without  the intention  of ‘passing’  the children  as their  own genetic  off-spring.  It is 
perhaps  possible  to  read  the  importance  that  parties  have  placed  on  the  choice  of 
donor in a different way, then, as evidence of their intention to jointly parent and as a 
manifestation  of  their  uniquely  non-biological  conception  process  —  a  process  in 






Sally  Sheldon  notes  that  Mr B’s  ‘emotional  investment’,  “does  not provide  a 
basis for legal rights, which are grounded in the more mundane and concrete realities 
of genetic and marital links, demonstrated intention to create a child or evidenced 
commitment  and  social  parenting”  (2005a,  356).  I  differ  from  Sheldon  here  as  to 
whether there was in fact a “demonstrated intention” to create a child. Mr B certainly 
intended to create embryos in an attempt to have a child. So when an embryo was used 
which was ‘his’, why was the child not ‘his’? For married couples in the UK (as in many 
comparable  jurisdictions)  it is the consent  of the partner  to treatment  that triggers 
legal  parenthood.22   But  the  Human  Fertilisation   and  Embryology  Act  1990  (UK) 
notably contains different provisions for married and unmarried heterosexual couples. 
Parental status for unmarried couples does not rest on consent; “no doubt”, riposted 





Although in this specific instance there was no informed consent from Mr B, and indeed the space for his 
consent on the treatment form was left blank, many jurisdictions presume in law that a partner’s consent has been 
given, although it can be rebutted in fact.  Hale LJ notes that such would have been the approach under UK law 
had Mr B and Ms D been married: Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA) para 24. 
 
23 
Re R [2005] 2 AC 621 (HL) para 14. 
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being treated “together”.24  Because Mr B was not being treated “together” with Ms D at 
the time of the embryo transfer he is not a father under UK law. 
 
 
If one centred intentionality, the question to ask instead might be: having 
consented  to the  conception  enterprise  as a whole  is there  any evidence  of Mr B’s 
refusal  of consent  in this specific  instance?  In that case it is quite likely that Mr B 
would be found to be the legal father of R.25 However, such an approach would also 
impose  legal  parenthood  upon  a  deceived  Mr  B  even  if  he  did  not  wish  it  –  for 
example, if the mother intended, in Hale LJ’s words, to “extract  child support” from 
B26 - in which case Hedley J (and Hale LJ on appeal) suggest our sympathy would lie 
“all the other way”.27  Like Hedley J, Hale LJ decries ‘sympathy’ in her judgment as a 
misleading and unstable signifier. 
 
 
Hale LJ characterises the statutory provision according parental status as: 
 
an unusual provision, conferring the relationship of parent and child on people who are related 
neither by blood nor marriage. Conferring such relationships is a serious matter…The rule should 
only apply to those cases which clearly fall within the footprint of the statutory language.28 
 
Implicit in this passage is the place of genetics and marriage (preferably both, but if 
not  then  one  in  place  of  the  other)  as  the  essence  of  the  legal  relationship  of 
 
24  
Human Fertilisation  and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 28(3). Reforms passed by the House of Lords and 
currently  before  the  House  of  Commons  continue  to  provide  different  bases  for  parentage  of  married  and 
unmarried couples, but incorporate a clearer consent basis for unmarried couples in the “agreed fatherhood” 
provisions: see Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007 (UK) 120 07-08 Cls 36-38 (as amended by 
Committee 13 June 2008). 
 
25 
This was the approach taken by Hedley J at first instance, characterised as a “fiction of continuing consent” by 
R’s guardian at the House of Lords: Re R [2005] 2 AC 621 (HL). Given that a married couple would have been 
presumed to be consenting (see above n. 22), it is arguable that the fiction involved was instead that of treating 
married and unmarried infertile couples differently. 
 
26 
Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA) para 29 (emphasis added). 
 
27 
B and D v R [2002] 2 FLR 843 para 8; ibid. 
 
28 
Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA) para 20. 
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parenthood.29  This is mirrored in a number of statements from other judgments in Re. 
R, in which the relationships involved are characterised as destabilising, fictional or 
abnormal  and for these reasons potentially  harmful  to the child.30  Yet if we believe 
that  non-marital  families  and  non-genetic  parenting  relationships  are  both 
commonplace and socially acceptable, one’s sympathies — if let loose — may lead one 
to be rather  less concerned  to limit  recognition  of parenthood.31   Lynne  Henderson 
argues that, “Empathy may enable the decisionmaker to see other ‘right’ answers, or a 
continuum of answers” (1987, 1653). In this light we might begin by asking a different 
question, such as: in an intention-based  conception enterprise such as this one, what 
effect  does  –  and  should  -  deception  have  on  intention?  If we  respect  this  family 
formation as something that was initiated as a joint endeavour leading to the creation 
of an embryo,  disrupted  by a lost opportunity  to consent  prior to its transfer,  why 
could not Mr B be provided by the court with the reinstatement of consent in the form 
of a choice to conclusively affirm or deny paternity at some later point? 
 
 
But then, what of the mendacious Ms D? We have little discussion of her 
intentions, or her choices, and little or no opportunity to empathise with her position. 
Hedley J found “Ms D a wholly unreliable witness whose evidence and memory were 
at every turn coloured by her determination to have a child and to exclude Mr B from 




Lord Hope makes a very similar statement:  Re R [2005] 2 AC 621 (HL) para 6. 
 
30 
See eg. Ibid Lord Walker paras 35, 42; Re R [2001] 1 FLR 247 para 6 Hedley J refers to the three men who are 
potential biological and social fathers to the child as a “warning to consider the implications for any child so 
conceived as well as regard to the rights of prospective parents”. 
 
31  
Indeed my sympathies alert me to the many intra-lesbian cases in which courts have refused to even hear the 
claim of a non-biological mother for contact with her child, no matter the merits of the case, because ‘non-parent’ 
claims are not expressly authorised by legislation, discussed in Millbank, 2008b. 
 
32 
Re R [2001] 1 FLR 247 para 11. 
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about her relationship with Mr B, kept the treatment and pregnancy secret from Mr B 
and initially also lied in evidence  about her dealings with the hospital. The court at 
first  instance  held  that  Ms  D made  unfounded  allegations  about  Mr B’s behaviour 
towards her when opposing his application for contact and parental responsibility, 
including   allegations   of  “domestic   violence   and  non-consensual   sex”  as  well  as 
harassment  by telephone.  As the  appeals  focus  on  parental  status  (limited  indirect 
contact  was  ordered  at  first  instance   and  the  parental   responsibility   issue  was 
adjourned), these issues are entirely erased in the later judgments and we are left only 
with Mr B’s earnest wish to be a father. Yet feminist research suggests that domestic 
violence is both under-reported and under-recognised in family law decision-making, 
leading us to question whether every “unfounded” allegation of domestic violence is 
actually  false  (Kaye,  Stubbs  &  Tolmie  2003;  Kaspiew  2005).  The  erasure  of  the 
possibility  of violence,  or of any rational  reasons  for D’s seeking  to “exclude”  Mr B 
begins to trouble me. 
 
 
This generates other questions about Ms D, in particular why she lied to the 
hospital  and  why she withheld  the  information  that  she was undergoing  treatment 
from Mr B. These facts are not ‘just’ facts: they arise in the context of UK legislation on 
fertility  treatment  which is prescriptive  in nature  and discriminatory  in application. 
The Act provides that “a woman shall not be provided with treatment services unless 
account has been taken of the welfare of any child who may be born as a result of the 
treatment (including the need of that child for a father).”33  Until 2001 this provision 






Human Fertilisation  and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 13(5). Reforms currently before parliament replace 
‘father’ with ‘supportive parenting’: Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007 cl 14(2). 
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treatment altogether.34  Even though increasing numbers of lesbians and single women 
have accessed fertility services in the UK in recent years as the legislation has been 
interpreted more liberally,35 they may still be lawfully excluded by any provider, and 




If Ms D had told the hospital her relationship with Mr B had broken down they 
would  have  stopped  treatment  and  required  her  to  go  through  a  new  round  of 
counselling and assessment.37    Even if Mr B had been able to vary the terms of his 
consent38   and had consented  to D’s use  of the embryo,  treatment  could  have  been 
refused because of the clinic’s interpretation of the potential child’s ‘need’ for a father. 
The most likely course is that Ms D would have had to apply for permission to undergo 
another full cycle of IVF to generate embryos with her new partner. Given that this was 
 
34 
Almack 2005 at 4 notes a 2001 survey of UK clinics by a same-sex parents group which found that only 25% of 
clinics reported that they accepted lesbian clients. 
 
35  
Human Fertilisation and Embryology Agency (HFEA), ‘Figures for Treatment of Single Women and Lesbian 
Couples                                                                                                                                                         2000-2005’ 
<http://www.hfea.gov.uk/cps/HFEA/files/Figures_for_treatment_of_single_women_and_lesbian_couples_2000- 
2005.pdf> (accessed 10 July 2008). See reference to the ‘relaxation’ of the ‘need for a father’ standard since 2001: 
“‘Bio-panic’ sees Twice as Many Single Women Try for Babies” The Telegraph (UK), 9 October 2006. The 2005 
HFEA Guidelines on s13(5) provide that, ‘Where the child will have no legal father, the treatment centre is 
expected to assess the prospective mother’s ability to meet the child’s/children’s needs and the ability of other 
persons within the family or social circle willing to share responsibility for those needs’: HFEA, Revised 
Guidelines, Welfare of the Child and Information Sections under the Code of Practice, 2005,   Cl 3.9 




HFEA notes that access for single women and same-sex couples will “vary from clinic to clinic”: HFEA Guide 
to Infertility 07/08, online at <http://www.hfea.gov.uk/docs/Guide2.pdf>   p. 13 (accessed 10 July 2008). There 
remains widespread confusion among providers regarding ‘social criteria’, such as relationship status, in providing 
treatment: see Linda Harrison, ‘A Survey Measuring the Impact of NICE Guidelines 11: Fertility – Assessment 
and Treatment for People with Fertility Problems’ (2005) p. 12. The British Fertility Society concluded that there 
is considerable disparity in the application of social criteria and resulting inequity of access to publicly funded 
treatment: see R Kennedy, C Kingsland et al, ‘Implementation of the NICE Guideline – Recommendations from 




See Re R [2003] 2 All ER 131 (CA) para 25. 
 
38   
It is  questionable whether this  was  contemplated under  the 1990  Act, but is possible under amendments 
currently before parliament: see Human Fertilisation and Embryology Bill 2007 cl 4, cl 37, Sch 3. 
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a new relationship, they may not have been approved. Even if treatment was approved 
it would have entailed invasive medical treatment and lengthy delays. The National 
Health Service (NHS) only covers the full cost of between one and three cycles of IVF 
for women under 40,39  with a waiting list for treatment  (depending  on region) that 
may be years long, and indeed is longer if donor sperm is required.40  The case reports 
reveal that Ms D and Mr B were first referred to the clinic in 1992, they waited two 
years before seeing a specialist, and then waited a further two years from the time of 
seeing  the specialist  (during  which time they undertook  three  counselling  sessions) 
before approval for treatment was finally granted. There was then a further delay of 
almost a year before treatment  actually commenced  in 1998.   Looked at in another 
way, if the health system was better resourced or more efficient, R could have been 
born long before B and D broke up. 
 
 
We are never told how old Ms D was at the time she conceived, nor what the 
source of her difficulty with conceiving was, but a fair inference may be that her 
reproductive choices were severely constrained. This embryo may have been D’s best 
hope of having a child, or it may have been her only hope.  In this light, more than six 
years  after  first  seeking  assistance  in  conceiving,  with  health  services  that  were 
limited,  slow and  discriminatory,  a possibly  violent  ex-partner,  a new  partner  who 










See eg. a two year waiting list in North Yorkshire that was then subject to a suspension of treatment for 12-18 
months: Lucy Stephens. IVF Blow for the Childless. The York Press,  30 April 2007, 
http://www.yorkpress.co.uk/news/campaigns/doctor/display.var.1364376.0.ivf_blow_for_the_childless.php 
(accessed 10 July 2008). Waiting time of seven months in Glasgow contrasts with three years in the Lothians: 
Russell    Jackson.    IVF    Waiting    List    Grows    to    Three    Years.    The    Scotsman,    8    May    2007, 
http://news.scotsman.com/topics.cfm?tid=459&id=712182007 (accessed 10 July 2008). 
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an invasive full cycle of IVF, I feel rather more understanding of D’s decision to lie in 
using ‘her’ embryo than on first reading the judgments. 
 
 
I notice that I shifted here from referring to the embryo that created R as ‘his’ 
embryo to labelling it ‘her’ embryo. In the first draft this was an unconscious shift, and 
in edits I then changed it to ‘the’ or ‘their’ embryo in an attempt to signal neutrality. 
Writing  a third draft I felt this was an essentially  dishonest  disclaiming  of my own 
thesis, so I put the possessive forms back in (but within quotation marks this time, to 
demonstrate that I had noticed). I began by empathising with Mr B and ended by 
empathising with Ms D. This shift alerts us to what Henderson calls the possibility of 
“decisional paralysis” if one empathises with both of the affected parties in a dispute 
(1987, 1653). Can the embryo be both ‘his’ and ‘hers’? This question  is brought out 
most acutely if we consider: what if Mr B had been consulted and refused his consent? 
Given the constraints on Ms D’s reproductive choices just outlined, I am not at all 
convinced that Mr B should have the power to prevent Ms D from using the embryo. 
 
 
Empathy now does seem an extremely unreliable aid to interpretation, as this 
imagined fact scenario leads to an outcome of unilateral use of the embryo for Ms D 
that appears utterly inconsistent  with my earlier position that Mr B should have the 
choice of fatherhood and that such choice is not contingent on genetic connection. 
However, this is not necessarily so, as the conclusion of inconsistency presumes that 
consent to conception attempts and consent to legal parenthood are inextricably 
intertwined.  Yet  it  is  possible  to  frame  rules  about  the  use  of  gametes  and  the 
parentage of children that differ, reflecting the fact that adults may have very different 
relationships with gametes, embryos and foetuses than with children. It is difficult but 
not impossible to contend that if men in IVF conception endeavours  withdraw their 
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consent after the creation of embryos the effect should be that they are not a parent in 
law rather than granting an absolute or inevitable veto over use of the embryo.   This 
should not be a specific exception for Mr B because he is a non-genetic parent, but a 
more   general   rule   premised   on  the   far  greater   physical   toll   faced   by   women 
undergoing IVF and the (usually) more limited reproductive opportunities available to 
them. I would apply the same principles of consent to men who do have a genetic 
connection  to the embryo  as well as those who don’t, and to lesbian co-mothers  as 
well. Empathy, then, need not lead to paralysis; it may instead draw us away from the 
binary  positions  that  adversarial  decision-making  engenders  and  open  up  a  more 
complex series of considerations and potential outcomes. 
 
 
The case brought  by Natalie  Evans, culminating  in an appeal  in 2007 to the 
Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights raises an extreme example of 
a male partner’s ‘veto’ power in IVF which brought forth strong emotional reactions in 
both  the public  and the  judiciary.41   In that  case  Natalie  Evans  was diagnosed  with 
slow-growing ovarian tumours and advised that she could undergo one cycle of egg 
harvesting  prior to surgery to remove  her ovaries and fallopian  tubes, which would 
allow her to undertake IVF later in life.  Unlike the unmarried couple in Re R, Evans 
and her partner, Howard Johnston, were rushed through assessment and treatment 
because of her illness: she was told of her diagnosis, counselled and had signed the 
consent forms for fertility treatment in the space of an hour.42 Evans asked if her eggs 
could  be  frozen   without   first  fertilising   them  with  Johnston’s   sperm   (a  highly 
experimental  treatment  at that  time)  and was  told  that  the  clinic  was only  able  to 
 
41   
See  eg.  “Your  views”  at  the conclusion  of  “Women  Lose  Embryo Battle”  BBC  News  1  October  2003, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/3151762.stm (accessed 10 July 2008); “Medical Expert Reaction” BBC News 10 
April 2007, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/6541737.stm (accessed 10 July 2008). 
 
42 
Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903 at paras 46-49. 
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freeze embryos not eggs.   Johnston urged Evans “not to be negative”,  reassured her 
that he wanted to have children with her, and the couple signed consents to be treated 
together.43 The procedure went ahead some weeks later in which six embryos using the 
gametes  of  both  partners  were  ultimately  created  and  frozen.  Evans  and  Johnston 
broke up six months later and two months after the break-up Johnston informed the 
clinic  of  this  fact,  indicating  that  he  wished  the  embryos  to  be  destroyed.  Evans 
instituted proceedings in the Family Division of the High Court seeking, inter alia,  an 
injunction to restore Johnston’s consent, a declaration of incompatibility of various 
sections  of  the  Human  Fertilisation   and  Embryology  Act  1990  with  the  Human 
Rights Act 1998 due to interference with her rights to privacy and family life as well as 
the  right  to  found  a  family,44    and  a  claim  to  promissory   estoppel.   Evans  was 
unsuccessful on all counts and remained so on appeal at the Court of Appeal45  and in 
her claim against the United Kingdom in the European Court of Human Rights46  and 
Grand Chamber47  (although there were two dissenting judges in the European Court 
and four in the Grand Chamber). 
 
 
As  in  the  case  of  Re  R,  the  discriminatory  child  ‘welfare’  provision  in  UK 
legislation and practice has a lot to answer for in Evans (Sheldon 2004). Clinic staff 
attested that if Ms Evans had insisted on pursuing fertility options that did not leave 
her dependent  on Mr Johnston’s  participation  and consent  (and given the ultimate 
outcome of the case, one must say, control) then they would probably not have treated 
 
43 
Id para 58. 
 
44 
Evans was joined in the first case by Lorraine Hadley, whose husband had also withdrawn consent to the use of 
their embryos upon their relationship breakdown. Hadley did not appeal. 
 
45 
Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025. Evans was refused leave to appeal to the House of Lords. 
 
46 
Evans v United Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (ECtH.R). 
 
47 
Evans v United Kingdom [2007] 2 FCR 5 (Grand Chamber). 
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her at all, based on their “perception of the suitability and appropriateness of IVF 
treatment for the couple since the welfare of any potential child or children from such 
treatment  is  always  our  paramount  concern”.48   In  a  non-discriminatory   program 
Evans could have  had some  or all of her eggs fertilised  with donor sperm  (or even 
frozen unfertilised, although it was at that stage a highly experimental procedure49), to 
hedge her bets as it were. However in the UK regime as it then stood these options 
would not only have been refused but likely led to a denial of treatment  altogether. 
While there is not scope in this article to explore all of the arguments made by Evans, 
the lack of judicial attention to the relationship between the discriminatory legislative 
provisions and the loss of Evan’s reproductive freedom is really regrettable. The issue 
is not just the question that the courts focus on, which is that Johnston denied his half 
of bilateral consent required by the legislation; rather, the deeper rights infringement 
was that the legislation forced Evans into the position of being solely dependent upon 
his consent in the first place. 
 
 
As in the Re R case, sympathy was both openly acknowledged and clearly 
distrusted throughout the multiple Evans judgments. In the Family Division, Wall J 
commences his summary of the disputed facts about the decision to generate embryos, 
“by recording my sympathy for Ms Evans both in relation to her medical condition and 
to the events of that day”50  and concludes his assessment of the right to privacy and 






Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903 para 53, see also para 55. 
 
49  
The first baby born in the UK from a frozen egg was in May 2002: see HFEA, ‘Freezing and Storing Your 
Eggs’ Factsheet November 2006. The practice is increasing: see ‘Career Women Must Not Have Eggs Frozen to 
Delay Family’ The Times 18 October 2007. 
 
50 
Id at para 44. 
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respect for the scheme which Parliament has put in place”.51  If anything, the judges of 
the Court of Appeal are more open in acknowledging their emotional responses to the 
case. The majority judges, Thorpe and Sedley LJJ, preface a number of statements of 
facts with “sadly” and describe the situation as a “tragedy” for Ms Evans, while Arden 
LJ’s concurring judgment characterises the issues as “emotive” and the experience of 
infertility as causing “great personal distress”.52  Yet the majority conclude their 
discussion of the right to privacy and family life with the finding that the “sympathy 
and  concern  which  anyone  must  feel  for  Ms  Evans  is  not  enough  to  render  the 
legislative scheme …disproportionate”.53 
 
 
The  majority   in  the  European   Court  of  Human   Rights54    and  the  Grand 
Chamber55 also expressed “great sympathy” for Evans. Yet in all of the judgments 
sympathy is swiftly and completely overwhelmed by the discourse of formal equality. 
Both Evans and Johnston have a genetic tie to the embryos in dispute, Evans wants a 
genetically related child while Johnston does not; this is transformed into an “equal” 
claim to the embryos involving an equal right to consent to use and an equal right to 
withdraw  consent  to  use  and  determine   their  destruction.56    The  deployment   of 
equality in the judgments is profoundly gender-blind and is informed by a series of 
completely inapplicable  reproductive  analogies and reversals that are used to ‘prove’ 
how equal the treatment of Evans and Johnston is in law (see Lind 2006 and Sheldon 
 
51 
Id at para 260. A postscript to the judgments repeats the expression of sympathy at para 317. 
 
52 
Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025 paras 80, 81. 
 
53 
Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025 at para 69. 
 
54 
Evans v United Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR. 585 (ECtHR) para 67. 
 
55 
Evans v United Kingdom [2007] 2 FCR. 5 (Grand Chamber) para 90. 
 
56 
Equality of treatment was raised at first instance by the Secretary of State: Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] 
All ER 903 paras 237, 238, 240 and by Johnston and Hadley’s counsel in paras 246, 247. 
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2004). In particular, the judgment in the Family Division deflects Evan’s arguments 
on her right  to privacy  and family  life by framing  her claim  as one which  seeks  to 
“impose” parenthood on Johnston and thrice using a hypothetical reversal of Johnston 
seeking to “impose” parenthood onto Ms Evans through a forced implantation of the 
embryo and forced pregnancy.57  In the most simplistic of syllogisms the obvious 
unacceptability  of  coerced  pregnancy  for  women  conclusively  proves  the 
unacceptability  of using embryos without men’s consent.58  The equality implications 
of this analogy were repeated or referred to with approval on a number of occasions by 
the appeal courts.59 
 
Yet as Craig Lind has argued, it is not at all an uncommon experience for men 
to become parents against their will, nor does this experience necessarily impact upon 
their lives greatly (Lind 2006; Lind 2003). Moreover, even in extreme cases of deceit 
and impaired consent, Sally Sheldon notes the law has itself imposed parental status 
upon fathers (Sheldon 2001). Johnston’s position in the case draws on both genetic 




Eg. id at para 184 (emphasis added): 
the right to respect for private life applies equally to both Mr Johnston and Mr Hadley. An unfettered 
right on the claimant’s part to have the embryos transferred into them would, by parity of reasoning, 
constitute an interference with respect of the men’s art 8 rights, in the same way that any attempt on their 
part to insist that the claimants have the embryos transferred into them against their will would 
undoubtedly constitute an interference both with the claimants’ right to autonomy over their own bodies, 
and with respect for their private lives. 
This analogy is repeated at para 251, and extended to include the man having testicular cancer in para 319. 
 
58 
The final example was prefaced with the remark that it “is not difficult to reverse the dilemma”: id at para 319. 
In fact, it is extremely difficult to reverse the dilemma given that if Mr Johnston had had cancer he could easily 
have frozen his semen independently and would not have needed to create embryos. Moreover, Craig Lind notes 
the legislation required clinics providing any treatment to women to consider the child’s “need for a father” but 
did not have any such requirement to consider mothers if men were seeking treatment (2006). Further, if embryos 
were created, ‘reversing’ the dilemma does not lead inexorably to forced pregnancy; it could include options such 
as the use of embryos with a new partner, or with a surrogate. 
 
59 
See eg. Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025 Arden LJ concurring at para 111 “Motherhood could 
surely not be forced on Ms Evans and likewise fatherhood cannot be forced on Mr Johnston”; Evans v United 
Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (E.Ct.H.R.) para 66. The analogy was disapproved by the dissenting judges in Evans 
v United Kingdom [2007] 2 FCR 5 (Grand Chamber) para 14. 
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fathers’ rights discourse.60  The Family Division holds that Johnston should not be the 
biological  father  of  a  child  “with  whom  [he]  could  not  enjoy  any  form  of  natural 
paternal  relationship”.61   (Although,  as I argue in Re D, the court could allow him a 
choice at this later point, and indeed Evan’s position was that Johnston could “play as 
little or as great a role as he wished”.62 In this light, much stress falls on the word 
“natural”). Implicitly, references in the judgments to the potential child’s interests rest 
on the assumed  harm of being raised  fatherless.63   While  not in any way endorsing 
Evans’ ‘right to life’ arguments on behalf of the embryos,64  I note that the figure of the 
potential   child   appears   in  a  deeply   paradoxical   manner,   her  imagined   welfare 
demanding only her non-existence. 
 
Commentators  on  the  US embryo  dispute  cases  have  noted  that  the 
“imposition” on men in these circumstances need not involve either legal or social 
parenthood (Cahn 2002; Waldman 2004), and so could be no more than knowing that 
there is, somewhere in the world, a person genetically connected to them. Naomi Cahn 





60  ‘Involvement’ for men in parenting may also bear some relation to ‘control’. It is interesting that Johnston’s 
recollection of the consent process included the following observation: “I was reassured by the fact that I would 
still maintain the same control regarding this decision as I would had these unfortunate events not occurred”: 
Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903 at para 49. 
 
61 
Id at para 319. The court also finds that Johnston would be financially liable to support the child and could not 
be released from this obligation by Evans. Given the findings on the requirement of ‘treatment together’ to accord 
paternity in Re R discussed above, this seems erroneous as they would not be treated ‘together’ at the time of 
transfer. Alternately, Evans could surely have entered into consent orders for a zero assessment under the Child 
Support Act 1991 (UK). Amendments before parliament, if passed, make it possible for a man to vary his consent 
to allow embryo transfer without agreeing to become a legal parent as a consequence, see above note 38. 
 
62 
Evans v United Kingdom [2006] 1 FCR 585 (ECtHR) para 52. 
 
63 
Alternately, the harm is in being ‘unwanted’ by her father which, even if it persisted and were made known to 
her, is still not an uncommon experience. 
 
64 
See Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2003] All ER 903 paras. 174-179. Evans was refused leave to argue this point 
on appeal: Evans v Amicus Healthcare [2004] 3 All ER 1025 para 19. 
26  
basing the right not to procreate on a fear of having genetically related offspring makes genes 
the central and defining aspect of the parent-child relationship. This approach misstates the 
power of genes and biological parenthood and privileges one person’s genetic connection over 
another’s (Cahn 2002, 586-587). 
 
 
The extremity, the clear falsity and the repetition of the forced pregnancy analogy in 
the judgments suggest that although the judges are expressing “sympathy” for Evans, 
it is arguably Johnston with whom they actually empathise. The powerfully emotive 
example of a forcibly impregnated female body65 is conjured up for the sole purpose of 
demonstrating  an otherwise  invisible, even unintelligible  (or at least insignificant  in 
the  sense  of  being  both  common-place  and  non-intrusive)  harm  to  men:  genetic 
children they didn’t actively choose to have. It is men’s position we must feel for here, 
even if we have to use women’s bodies to do it. I claim this is an example of what 
Henderson labels “unreflective empathy”, where decision-makers connect with the 
position  of  parties  most  like  their  own  privileged   position  without   realising  or 
admitting  that they are doing so, and therefore  replicate  patterns  of covert 
discrimination  or entrenched inequalities that remain “unseen” by them (Henderson 
1987, 1584-1586, 1652). This is not to say that empathy is therefore unhelpful, rather it 
is  a  caution  that  –  like  other  forms  of  reasoning  –  it  can  be  used  in  lazy  ways. 
Henderson argues that “selective” or “unreflective” empathy masks rather than reveals 
moral   choice   (1652),   and   the   simplistic   embrace   of   formal   equality   discourse 
(facilitated  by  the  use  of  false  analogies)  in  the  Evans  judgments  bears  this  out 
powerfully. 
 
I believe that a reflective use of empathy in this case would help move beyond 





Present in the collective consciousness following the attempted genocide of Muslims in the Balkans war, inter 
alia, through rape and forced pregnancies. 
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which each party’s equal and opposite interest in the embryos’ use/destruction must 
balance each other out because of the over-riding ‘good’ of equality. Empathy should 
lead us to a far more contextual analysis both of the value of each party’s interest or 
investment  in  the  embryos  and  of  the  impact  on  each  of  them  of  their  use  or 
destruction. In terms of both interest and impact, Evans’ claim is more significant than 
Johnston’s,   so  she  should  be  able  to  use  the  embryos.66    Consistently   with  my 
arguments regarding Re R, if a child resulted, Johnston could then be given a choice as 
to whether or not he is a legal parent. 
 
 
Craig  Lind  notes  that  Evans’  position,   like  that  of  Johnston,   reflects   an 
“obsession   with   genetic   parenthood”   and   he  contends   that   judicial   and  public 
expressions  of sympathy for Evans were “the result of our collective  understating  of 
the appropriateness  of the desire of all would-be parents to have their own children” 
(Lind 2006, 586).  Here I support Evan’s claim in spite of, rather than because of, 
genetics. Evans had six viable embryos in storage; she did not have - and would likely 
have found it very difficult,  if not impossible,  to engage  - both an egg donor and a 
sperm donor for future conception efforts,67  even if she could have found a clinic that 
would treat her in such circumstances.  Nor is it likely as a single woman that Evans 
would be able to adopt a child. Evan’s predicament  did not rest, then, solely on her 
desire to have a genetically related child, but rather, like many lesbian mothers, came 
 
66   
If  this  remedy  seems  too  extreme,  for  example,  if  empathy  for  Johnston  were  to  restrain  one  from 
retrospectively over-ruling the terms of the consent form he signed, other outcomes are still possible. For example, 
one could have found that the “need for a father” provision of the Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 
(UK) or that the consent forms in use under the Act as it then stood were incompatible with the Human Rights Act 
1998 (UK) so that in later cases women would be availed of a wider range of reproductive options at the outset 
and granted greater autonomy over the use of embryos once created. 
 
67 
Even in private clinics in the UK, donor gametes are in extremely short supply: see ‘Worry over sperm donor 
shortage’, BBC News 31 July 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5230890.stm> ; ‘IVF donor sperm shortage 
revealed’, BBC News 13 September 2006 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/health/5341982.stm>; ‘Pay egg donors say 
fertility specialists’ The Independent 26 October 2006 <http://news.independent.co.uk/health/article1930121.ece> 
(all accessed 10 July 2008). 
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Both commissioning parents and lesbian mothers defy ‘naturalness’ and displace the 
primacy of bio-genetic ties in favour of intended relationships in family formation. In 
the  US  this  resonance  between  surrogacy  and  lesbian-led  families  has  been  most 
clearly articulated in scholarly consideration of the central role of intention in defining 
parental  status  of  families  formed  through  assisted  reproduction  (Storrow  2002; 
Bender 2006). The development of an “intended parent” doctrine by the Californian 
Supreme Court in the surrogacy dispute of Johnson v Calvert68 and extension of it by 
the California  Court of Appeal to both non-biological  commissioning  parents  in the 
child support dispute of Buzzanca69  has highlighted  the issue even more strongly in 
the US context. When the leading US lesbian rights organisation, the National Center 
for Lesbian  Rights  (NCLR),  published  a ‘Model  Brief’  for co-mother  recognition  in 
2000, it drew extensively  on Buzzanca  and sought to extend principles of intention 
drawn from surrogacy disputes (Minter & Kendall 2000). The NCLR submissions in 









Johnson v Calvert, 851 P2d 776 (1993). 
 
69 
Buzzanca v Buzzanca 72 Cal Rptr 2d 280 (1998). 
 
70 
Elisa B v Superior Court of El Dorado County, 37 Cal 4th 108 (2005). See eg. NCLR Opening Brief and Reply 
Brief for Emily B, available at http://www.nclrights.org/site/DocServer/elisab_nclrbrief_020805.pdf?docID=761. 
Accessed 10 July 2008. 
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Like the Rutherford  mothers drawing on Trociuk, the Elisa B claim causes me 
unease  as  the  use  of  abstract  principles  about  the  role  of  ‘intention’  drawn  from 
surrogacy case law elides important differences in factual context. Many US surrogacy 
cases concern disputes between commissioning parents and gestational mothers who 
have changed their minds about relinquishing  the child.   “Intention”  in these cases, 
then,  is  about  the  unchanged  intention  of  the  commissioning  parents  versus  the 
changed  intention  of  the  ‘surrogate’  or  gestational  mother.  Centring  intention  in 
surrogacy  disputes  may  thus  mean  prioritising  pre-conception  intention  over  post- 
birth intention, and privileging the commissioning parents’ intentions over the 
reproductive labour of the gestational mother. Centring intention in lesbian families to 
gain recognition of the co-mother from the State for intact lesbian families, or to assert 
parental  status  for  the  co-mother  in  the  context  of  intra-lesbian  disputes  about 
children, is not directly comparable to surrogacy disputes because it does not entail 
depriving  the birth mother of parental status against her wishes. 
 
 
In lesbian-led families, the closest analogy may be in cases where the intended 
family was one involving two mothers who are primary carers and an uninvolved (or 
‘family friend’) role for a known sperm donor who changes his mind post-birth  and 
seeks to be an involved parent. An increasing number of such disputes are arising over 
very young babies, in which case there is little or no pre-existing pattern of contact and 
the donor’s claims rest firmly on biological connection.71  In these cases, centring pre- 
conception intention would exclude the sperm donor from parental status (and from 
seeking to establish a parental relationship) regardless of his genetic connection to the 




See eg. Re Patrick (2002) FLC 93-096; X v Y (2002) SLT (Sh Ct) 161; H and J & D [2006] FamCA 1398; McD 
v L [2007] IESC 28; Mc D v L & Anor [2008] IEHC 96. 
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binding contracts with known sperm donors to achieve exactly this end (Polikoff 1996; 
 
2000). Yet it is hard to imagine lesbian and feminist scholars arguing in favour of 
agreements  binding  surrogate  mothers.72  While  it is important  to acknowledge  that 
there  may  be  a  commonality   in  the  experience   between  surrogates  and  donors 
engaging in the reproductive  endeavours of others – such as unexpected love for the 
child leading to feelings of regret, grief or guilt (see eg. Dempsey 2004, who argues 
that some gay sperm donors had an experience closer to relinquishment than gamete 
donation) – a gender-blind analogy fails to take into account the massive differential 
in reproductive labour between a sperm donor and a gestational mother. 
 
 
All of this suggests that one must be very careful to be truly fact-sensitive in 
drawing analogies  or extending  principles in the context of surrogacy. In particular, 
the unique  position  of the gestational  mother must be acknowledged,  including  the 
value of her reproductive labour, her relationship with the foetus and the importance 
of her bodily autonomy (Bender 2006). Even the most basic empathic response tells us 
that gestational mothers should not be forced by law to relinquish children any more 
than  they  should  be prevented  by law from  having  abortions  (Storrow  2002).  This 
means privileging the intentions of the gestational mother over other participants by 
allowing her to change her mind through the pregnancy and for some time afterwards 
(although both a sense of fairness to the commissioning parents and a best interests 
approach to the child’s attachments would suggest not indefinitely). Privileging the 
gestational mother’s intentions (but not those of a sperm donor) accords with the 
fundamental values laid out at the opening of this article in that it does not prioritise 




For an argument that intent-based or functional parenting recognition for lesbian parents cannot be applied to 
gay male parents conceiving through surrogacy, see Appleton 2006. 
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genetic parents,73  and it does value caregiving relationships (in this case to the foetus) 
 





These considerations mean that it is vital to distinguish between the legal issues 
of parentage in surrogacy arrangements where there is no dispute between the 
participants and those that involve competing claims to parentage and residence of the 
child when the adults are in dispute. In harmonious surrogacy arrangements the 
commissioning parents are the social parents of the child but their legal and genetic 
relationships do not ‘match’. One or both may be genetic parents, or neither may be, 
but in each situation both commissioning parents will likely lack legal status. In many 
jurisdictions the legal parents of a child born through any form of assisted conception 
are the gestational mother and her consenting male partner (eg. in Australian states, 
see Millbank 2006). A number of cases reveal that commissioning fathers who are also 
genetic fathers list themselves on the birth certificate regardless of such provisions,74 
and so may be able to ‘pass’ if their status is unquestioned, whereas the commissioning 
mother is always excluded.  Co-mothers  in lesbian-led  families are likewise intended 
and functioning parents who are (largely) unrecognised in law, and so I argue that 
empathy  should  lead  lesbian  mothers  to  support  legal  status  for  commissioning 
parents in harmonious surrogacy arrangements. 
 
Validating the intended family form and valuing the caring relationship of the 






Unlike many US cases where the success of the commissioning mother’s claim has often hinged on whether or 
not she is the genetic mother: see Storrow, 2002. 
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See eg. Re Evelyn (1998) FLC 92-807; PJ v Department of Community Services [1999] NSWSC 340; King and 
Tamsin [2008] FamCA 309. 
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the  consensual   transfer   of  parental   status  between   the  adults.75    Privileging   the 
intention of the gestational mother requires that any transfer of status take place with 
her informed consent in a period after  birth.76  Legislation allowing for the transfer of 
parental  status  to the commissioning  parents  of a child  between  six weeks  and six 
months old by court order was passed in 1994 in both the UK77  and the Australian 
Capital Territory (ACT).78 Similar legislation before parliament in Western Australia in 
2008 will, if passed, allow for transfer of parental status between 28 days and one year 
after the birth.79 However, unlike the Western Australian proposal, the ACT and UK 
regimes remain inadequate because they continue to prioritise genetic relationships: 
parties  are only  eligible  to transfer  status  if one of the commissioning  parents  is a 
genetic  parent and the gestational  mother is not.80  So it is not intended  parents as 
such, but rather a genetic parent and their partner who are able to have parentage 
transferred  to  them.  Moreover,  the  original  UK  provisions  were  only  available  to 







Similarly, when sperm donors are intended to be parents in multi-parent lesbian and gay family forms their role 
could be accommodated by a post-birth process that entails a sharing of parental status rather than transfer of 
status: see Victorian Law Reform Commission. 2005. Assisted Reproductive Technologies and Adoption, Position 
Paper  Two: Parentage  interim recommendation 13-4. However, note that this proposal was dropped in the final 
report on the basis that it was unwieldy and did not meet a demonstrated need by gay and lesbian families because 
of the generally non-residential role of biological fathers: Victorian Law Reform Commission. 2007. Assisted 
Reproductive Technology & Adoption, Final Report. 
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Pre-birth transfers of status, which are permitted in some US jurisdictions, would breach this principle: see 
Snyder & Byrn 2005. 
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Human Fertilisation and Embryology Act 1990 (UK) s 30, discussed in Stuhmcke 2004, 21. 
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The Substitute Parent Agreement Act 1994 (ACT) was replaced by Parentage Act 2004 (ACT) Div 2.5. 
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Surrogacy Bill 2007 (WA), passed by the lower house on 26 June 2008 and currently before the upper house. 
For current status see <http://www.parliament.wa.gov.au/web/newwebparl.nsf/iframewebpages/Bills+-+Current>. 
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legal spouse.81 A recognition system which truly valued the caregiving relationship of 
intended parents with the children they raise would not be subject to such limitations. 
 
 
In  situations  where  gestational  mothers  and  commissioning  parents  are  in 
conflict, the question of legal status is far more complex than in harmonious 
arrangements;  parental status, parental responsibility,  residence and contact may all 
be in issue between multiple adults, and are all potentially severable. Naomi Cahn has 
noted in the US context that, “[w]hile courts claim that they can separate the decision 
on parentage from that on custody, their decisions show that they do not” (Cahn 1991, 
1). In contrast to the US, courts in Britain and Australia have applied the child’s best 
interests test and shown themselves more inclined to fragment the legal components 
of parenthood  in situations  such as surrogacy  disputes  and ART mix-ups  (Sheldon 
2005b), where there are multiple contenders for parental status. The sole reported 
surrogacy dispute in Australian law, Re Evelyn, exemplifies this difference in approach 
with the court simply side-stepping the issue of legal parentage. In that case, the Full 
Court of the Family Court noted in a single line that the surrogate mother and 
commissioning father were the registered parents of the child, did not comment on the 
fact that this was not in accordance with either state law or the Family  Law  Act itself 
(both of which ascribed parental status to the surrogate’s husband)82  and at no stage 
appeared to consider a declaration  as to parentage.  While the contentious  issue was 





A number of US regimes are similarly limited: see discussion in Storrow, 2002, 643-644. Note that amendments 
currently before UK parliament would, if passed, extend the provisions considerably, including both civil partners 
and couples ‘who are living as partners in an enduring family relationship’: Human Fertilisation and Embryology 
Bill 2007 (UK) Cl 54. 
 
82 
At trial the issue was discussed at greater length because the Ss claimed legal parentage, however this claim was 
swatted away by the judge as a “legal fiction” which was subsumed by the best interests approach: see discussion 
in Otlowski 1999, 52-54. 
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couple and birth parents all share parental  responsibility  for the long term welfare, 
care and development of the child — in a very real sense creating four parents — and 
this part of the decision was not appealed. 
 
 
The facts of Re Evelyn also contrast with those of many US surrogacy disputes; 
it was an “altruistic” arrangement between mature adults who were long-term friends, 
Mrs and Mr S, and Mrs and Mr Q. Mrs S was both the gestational and genetic mother 
while Mr Q was the genetic father. Mr and Mrs S had three children, while the Qs were 
infertile as a result of Mrs Q having had ovarian cancer and in the year or two prior to 
the birth of Evelyn they had adopted a son of Aboriginal descent, Tom. It was the 
gestational mother, Mrs S, who initiated the arrangement and repeatedly pursued it in 
the face of ambivalence from the Qs. Perhaps most importantly, Evelyn lived with the 
Qs for more  than  six months  before  Mrs S removed  the  child from  their  care  and 
claimed  residence.  Evelyn  was returned  to the Qs care through  interim  orders  and 
stayed with them  for a further  six months  pending  trial. By the time of the appeal 
Evelyn was 18 months old and had lived with the Qs all her life. However the court 
ordered residence transferred to the Ss, with four days per month contact to the Qs. 
 
 
Re Evelyn is a distinctly atypical surrogacy dispute because it did not take place 
until  the  child  had  been  living  with  the  commissioning  parents  for  a considerable 
period of time. For that reason I acknowledge that broad conclusions cannot be drawn 
from it and applied to other surrogacy disputes. In my view, a child’s best interests 
analysis that properly valued stability of attachment under current law should have 
dictated that Evelyn remain with the Qs. I would also suggest that, consistently with 
the model  for consensual  transfer  of status  discussed  above,  a time-lag  of over  six 
35  
months after having relinquished the child should be enough to vitiate the ability of 
the gestational mother to change her mind. 
 
 
Commentators received Evelyn positively because it affirmed the child’s best 
interests principle  in surrogacy as in all other child-related  disputes,  and because it 
stated that there was no preference in law for biological parents (Otlowski 1999; 
Stuhmcke 1998). Yet the trial decision in Evelyn is extremely problematic in its 
construction of the “naturalness” of biological family and, while some aspects of the 
reasoning  were  criticised  by  the  Full  Court  of  the  Family  Court  of  Australia,  the 
decision was not disturbed on appeal. The trial court held that Evelyn would “find 
residence  in her  mother’s  home  as a more  natural  situation”.83   The  judgment  also 
featured a series of passages contrasting  the home of Evelyn’s biological father with 
that of her biological mother, such as: 
In pure mathematical terms [residing with the Ss] she would have ready access to five of the 
eight most significant people in her life…I have concluded that, on balance, a child in Evelyn’s 
situation is more likely to cope readily with the prospect of being required to visit the home of 
her biological father and step-brother from the comfort of the home of her biological mother 




The pre-eminence of biology in this passage is pervasive and un-rationalised. Firstly it 
is notable that Evelyn’s current home is characterised as that of her “biological father” 
- her social mother and primary caregiver, Mrs Q, is completely absent, and Tom is 
described  erroneously  as a “step-brother”.85     A linguistic sleight of hand transforms 





Re Evelyn (1998) FLC 92-807 at 85106. 
 
84 
Id at 85105. 
 
85  
Tom would be Evelyn’s step-brother if he were the biological or adopted child of Mrs Q but not Mr Q, as a 
step-child is a relation by reason of the marriage of one’s parent. Evelyn is the biological child of Mr Q and Tom 
is his child by adoption, so they are arguably half-siblings. 
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be among the most important people in her life although she has not yet met them. 
The next paragraph continues with the finding that the “loss of the opportunity to be 
raised with her biological siblings is a greater loss than likely to be occasioned if she is 
now   separated   from   Tom”   and   is   followed   by   repeated   declarations   that   the 
relationship of biological siblings is “special” and “cannot be replicated” by adopted 
siblings.86 Mrs S offers biological connection - and lots of it, more than the Qs ever can 
(because they are, after all, infertile). 
 
 
The Qs are here placed in a position similar to that of a lesbian co-mother in 
intra-lesbian   disputes   over   children,   where   their   history   of   care   for  the   child 
evaporates in the face of the biological mother’s position as the “natural” parent. The 
reference to “mathematical terms” in deciding the importance of Evelyn’s future family 
relationships  echoes a passage of the judgment of the House of Lords in the English 
intra-lesbian case of Re G which suggested that a biological mother is always ‘more’ of 
a mother than a social parent can be. In Re G the court accepted that parents in non- 
traditional families may be genetic, gestational or social/psychological, but went on to 
characterise the birth mother as “the natural mother of these children in every  sense 
of that term”87  and “both their biological and their psychological parent”88, while the 
co-mother,  like an adoptive  parent, could only ever be a psychological  parent.   In a 
recent critique of Re G, Alison Diduck argues that biological connectedness is seen as 
such an unquestioned good that it is not a factor additional to a child’s best interest or 
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Id para 37 (emphasis added). 
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take priority,  in the name  of welfare,  over social ones” (Diduck,  2007, emphasis  in 
original) – a remark equally applicable to the court’s approach in Re Evelyn. 
 
 
There are also a number of resonances between Re Evelyn  and lesbian mother 
versus donor disputes. In Re Evelyn  the trial court came to the empathic conclusion 
that “Evelyn will suffer problems relating to issues such as abandonment and identity 
during her adolescence”89  (and held that her biological mother would be most able to 
help  her  through  these  hypothetical  problems).  This  conclusion  was  based  on  the 
evidence of experts for the Ss, whose views were drawn from adoption literature.90  A 
great deal of literature  on adopted  children, like that of children conceived  through 
donor gametes, is based on the experiences of people who were not told about their 
origins as children and so experienced feelings of shock, deception or betrayal by their 
parents when they found out later in life (McNair 2004, 39-45; Haimes 1998). Such 
research is not necessarily applicable, or even relevant, to families formed through 
surrogacy or donor gametes where children are told the truth about their conception 
from the outset. (Note also that research into children being raised in families formed 
through surrogacy is only just beginning: see eg Golombok et al 2006).  Yet speculative 
opinions drawn from this body of knowledge were utilised in Re Evelyn to find as a 
certainty    that   Evelyn   would   suffer   problems   later   in   life   as   a   result   of   the 
circumstances of her conception. It is not difficult to see how such speculative 
misapplication  of  research  about  genetic  connection  could  play  out  in  many  other 







Re Evelyn (1998) FLC 92-807 at 85103 (emphasis added). 
 
90 
The Qs attacked the validity of such comparisons on appeal, leading the Full Court to note that in fact one of the 
experts had drawn his views more from foster care (85107), arguably an even less appropriate analogy. 
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long-running sperm donor versus lesbian mother case of P v K in New Zealand,91  the 
court relied upon child development research regarding the benefits of an on-going 
relationship   with   biological   parents   drawn   from   a  completely   different   context 
(separated heterosexual families) to support a finding which superimposed a biological 
father onto an intact functioning lesbian family. In such instances it seems that the 
(mis)use of research may be a pretext for the projection of ‘commonsense’ notions that 
seek to recreate genetic families in the face of contradictory experience. 
 
 
Another  issue in Re Evelyn  was the Qs’ attitude  to contact.  The Ss proposed 
liberal contact with the Qs should they have residence, whereas the Qs “expressed 
reservations” about contact between the Ss and Evelyn should Evelyn live with them.92 
In a ‘pro-contact’ family law culture which places great emphasis on biological 
relationships, the Ss’ attitude to contact bolstered their claim, while the Qs’ attitude 
harmed theirs. Yet the Qs’ concern that it would be undermining for Tom’s sense of 
stability and attachment to see his sister treated differently to him based on genetics 
(especially given that it seems he was the only non-white member of the family), was 
never seriously entertained.  The Qs felt that extensive  contact threatened  them as a 
family unit, whereas the court characterised  contact as simply maintaining Evelyn’s 
family  relationships.93   The  Qs’  concerns  about  an  absent  biological  parent 
undermining   their  sense  of  family  are  strongly  resonant  of  lesbian-led  families’ 
disputes  with  biological  fathers.  Lesbian  mothers  have  at  times  opposed  contact 
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93 “The Ss would like to have Evelyn taken to South Australia to enable the siblings to enjoy contact together”: Id 
at 85098. 
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undermining  their  family  unit,  confusing  to  the  child,  and  necessitated   unequal 
treatment of siblings based on genetic links when families were formed with different 
donors.94    Courts   have   been   overwhelmingly   dismissive   of   such   concerns,   have 
‘naturalised’ the role of donors as fathers and have characterised biological fathers as 




While in lesbian mother versus sperm  donor cases, fathers’  rights discourses 
and genetic essentialism flow seamlessly into one another to transform the role of 
biological  fathers  from  gamete  donors  into  bedrock  social  relationships  of 
unquestioned benefit to children, Re Evelyn shows that genetic essentialism does not 
always  benefit   fathers.   Ideas   of   genetic   truth   and   the   importance   of   genetic 
relationships to children do not stand alone; rather they are played out in the midst of 
other pre-existing conceptions of gender roles and family forms, which will sometimes 
reinforce and other times cut across them. For example, the modern context of family 
law  in  which  a  ‘normal’  father-child  relationship  commonly  entails  a  non-resident 
father, may make the decisions in Evelyn and in P v K seem more like the maintenance 
of a ‘normal’ cultural status quo to courts (biological or ‘natural’ fathers being granted 
beneficial contact with their children) rather than a dramatic breach and judicial 











See eg. Thomas S v Robin Y 618 NYS2d 356 (1994); 599 NYS2d 377 (1995); Re D [2006] EWHC 2; P v K 
[2006] NZLR 22. 
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These case studies highlight the competing place of social and genetic parenthood. By 
and large the decisions  document  the pervasiveness  of biological  understandings  of 
family and illustrate a powerful contemporary trend in family law to transpose ideas of 
‘genetic truth’ into actual social relationships. In Evans, the coalescence between the 
imposed  ‘need’  for  fathers  in  reproductive  technology  regulation  with  assumptions 
that any genetic connection is actually parenthood utterly thwarted Natalie Evans’ 
parental aspirations. In Re Evelyn the court assumed that separation from a biological 
mother  was  akin  to  the  ‘abandonment’   of  adoption  and  would  cause  long-term 
problems for a baby, while separation from her social mother/primary  caregiver was 
viewed as less significant. These cases evidence Alison Diduck’s argument that there 
has been a “shift in the relative importance of biological relationships over social ones” 
in family law in which genetic ‘truth’ has been enmeshed with both the discourse of 
children’s welfare and that of children’s rights (Diduck 2007). In Re. R, the court was 
confounded by the paradox of a willing (yet non-consenting) father who had no genetic 
link to the child. Although denied parental status, Mr B was nonetheless characterised 
as a holder of ‘genetic truth’ in the face of the mother’s deceit surrounding conception, 
and he was granted indirect contact to ensure, among other things, that the child was 




Unlike   most   family   law  determinations,   the  cases   under   discussion   here 
concern families formed by intention rather than by genetics alone. In addition, the 
cases all involve parties with parental claims who are not in relationships  with each 
other  or  living  in  common  households,  and  all  concern  very  young  children  or 
embryos.  Judges looking to, or for, ideas of ‘traditional’  family relationships  in this 
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context  is  mere  fantasy.  Reflective  empathy  may  play  an  important  role  in  such 
disputes, drawing attention to whose position is identified with and opening a more 
thoroughgoing investigation into what interests are valued, and why they are valued. 
Empathy may not provide ‘the answer’, but it should generate more nuanced questions 
that are pursued in a context-sensitive  rather than abstract fashion. Being mindful of 
empathy in an evaluative  inquiry may also take us beyond the oppositional  binaries 
that adversarial dispute resolution so often engenders. In the Evans and Re. R cases in 
particular, I argue that empathy should take us behind the parties’ individual positions 
in the dispute to ask how those positions were first moulded by social and legal 
conditions, and urge us to seek more creative resolution. In Re Evelyn I find strong 
resonances with the position of a heterosexual commissioning couple in a surrogacy 
arrangement and the experiences of lesbian families. 
 
 
Cultural narratives  of genetic essentialism  are in the ascendant  and I suggest 
that  this  augers  very  ill  for  non-biological  families  formed  with  the  use  of  donor 
gametes. In this light it may well be important for ‘reproductive outsiders’ of all kinds 
to   recognise   and   draw   on   their   commonalities,   while   being   respectful   too   of 
differences, in order to work for a legal regime that can fully accommodate both their 
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